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Wednesday, February 26, 2020

1991-1994 Peter Klevius wrote a book and told his friends and Francis Crick that there's no essential difference between a brick and them. Now some 30 yrs later physicists imply the same about sand dunes.


Peter Klevius brain tutorial: The only "consciousness" there is - is the word 'consciousness'.


"They're definitely communicating," physicist Nathalie Vriend from Cambridge University said in an interview with The Washington Post.

and here's Peter Klevius take on sand dunes:




Here Peter Klevius (right) has just informed his friend (middle) that there's no difference between Peter Klevius wife (left) and a brick. That's why his friend looks slightly puzzled.



Whoever interested in what consciousness is and how the brain works, need to read Peter Klevius stone example (see below) and the Even More Astonishing Hypothesis (see below). In fact, Peter Klevius stone example should be compulsory reading for everyone - just like a vaccination against dumb or deliberately evil "spirituality".

That will cure much of your "religiosity" etc. bias.

Peter Klevius knows about aliens because he is one - you're too. Most parents see their children turning into aliens already in their teens (that's how the concept 'teenager' emerged). Changing education/job and location also alienates. And when we send humans on multi-generational space trips, their grand-grand-grand etc. -children will have absolutely nothing in common with the grand-grand-grand etc. -children to those humans who stayed on Earth or went to other places. Of course, there's no reason to send people in the future - read Rendezvous with Rama by Arthur C. Clarke, the best science fiction ever written. Why isn't there a movie?!

The reason why Peter Klevius is so successful in scientific analysis is (except for his slightly "different" brain) the fact that he simply checks for bias (religious, political, economics etc) - and the results reveal themselves naturally. And according to Weiniger (who had a big influence on Wittgenstein), 'the Woman' is the main obstacle against women's emancipation, and according to Klevius, 'the Human' is the main obstacle against science. Klevius may accordingly be one of the last human scientists.

And of course, checking for all kinds of bias erases pretty much every possible source of support.

The first and most important redundancy to understand is to skip 'understanding' all together and replace it with 'adaptation'. That simple maneuvre will clean the playing field from distractions more than anything else.

We don't "observe" or "understand" - we adapt. And not only to our outer surrounding but eqaully to our own body incl. our brain. Or a brick turning into grovel/sand. Or a star etc.

Is the flying dust from what used to be a brick less or more "complex"? Or the supernova?

Although the brain/nerve system is more complex, it's no different from e.g. light skin that gets tanned in the sun.

And when Klevius says "we" he really means it. There's no "I" (other than as origo) or "self". As Klevius wrote on the web 2003: In creating this text Klevius would have been helpless without an assisting world". Wittgenstein showed the impossibility of a "private language" and Klevius showed (see the stone example below) that information is the flow of perception and that there's no difference between observation and understanding.

As a consequence there's no free will (even Luther realized this and threw it in the face of Erasmus) because free will is a linguistic mirage (although Luther called it dependancy on a "god").




Peter Klevius scientific biography: My bio-parents were both highly intelligent, thank you. Lincoln Barnett's book (co-written with Albert Einstein) was my favourite at age 14. In my early twenties I wrote an unpublished essay about universe and an other about automation. I see my own best asset as a scientist being lack of political, religious, academic etc. ties. I also see the danger in this setup as it could as well be the perfect road to "private pseudo-science" i.e. individual charlatanism, or "public pseudo-science" i.e. collective charlatanism. The latter may well include s.c. "highly respected" researchers.

However, being too much ahead of once time most often doesn't pay off. The only time I've been paid for my scientific revelations was back in 1981 when my mentor Georg Henrik von Wright (Wittgenstein's successor at Cambridge) convinced a paper to publish an article that apparently none of its editors and few of its readers understood. It was called Resursbegär (Demand for Resources) and was ten years later - again assisted by Georg Henrik von Wright - self-published in a 71 pp "book" in which I analyzed our "existence-centrism" in an unreachable universe. This included a new understanding of "consciousness" that emerged from my criticism of Haberma's division of communicative action in observation and understanding.


Klevius stone example

My view was and is that there can only be adaptation.

I exemplified it (1992:31-33, ISBN 9173288411) with 1) someone seeing (fotons) a stone and 2) telling (sound waves) about it to 3) someone who writes it down (text) to 4) someone else who sees  (fotons) the text. 5) Then the initial "observer" kicks the stone which turns out to be made of paper-mache.

Klevius argues that this example covers everything essential for understanding human information flow.



There's only now -

exemplified it (1992:31-33, ISBN 9173288411) with 1) someone seeing (fotons/understanding/language?*) a stone and 2) telling (sound waves/language) about it to 3) someone who writes it down (text/language) to 4) someone else who sees  (fotons) the text. 5) Then the initial "observer" kicks the stone which turns out to be made of paper-mache.

Klevius argues that this example covers everything essential for understanding human information flow.

1) is a specific perception (understanding) and thought (interpretation) synonymous with the individual's communicative use (compare Wittgenstein's "language game") of the concept 'stone'.

2) is the second individual's linguistic interpretation and understanding of a 'stone', but limited to this individual's specific communicative use of the term.

3) same as above

4) same as above

5) a new perception (understanding)

This last one isn't to be seen as a "correction" but just as part of a continuous flow of adaptation.

* some people understand without necessarily putting a word on it



In 1994 I developed my theory calling it EMAH ('the Even More Astonishing Hypothesis', alluding to Francis Crick's 1994 book The Astonishing Hypothesis). EMAH has been on the web since 2003. In the “book” I also warned how research is vulnerable to be choked by its own peer steered citation cartels. I finished the book by exemplifying a new division of human cultures in a chapter called Khoi, San and Bantu. My moral bedrock since my teens rests on universal (negative) Human Rights for everyone - incl. women.


Here's rough Google translate based "translation" from Klevius 1992 book Demand for Resources:

What I want to say is that there is a culturally independent "thought intelligence" and that there is an intellectual difference between cats, monkeys and humans even when body? and environmental experiences are equated. A person can simply boast of experiences in a cat impossible way, no matter how dull the lives they both lived. Produced in this way, the matter seems obvious, but it is often diffused in the debate.

I also find it difficult to understand the relevance of the theory of the so-called The "Machiavellian Intelligence" which states that social manipulation skills would have shaped and driven our intelligence. For me, it seems as if successful% ocio play "today seems to lack intelligence and / or thought correlation. It is more exceptional, in relation to other factors, that fruitfully intriguing carries fruit. You can as well see memory capacity (in an ecological context ) as a consequence of the selection factor and social interaction.

An interesting detail in this context is that the large brain of man as well as of other animals is actually the "neck" upon which it so-called. the olfactory center (the odor organ) is associated with the brain stem. This "olfactory neck" has, in man, received its longest and most complex design, while man actually has denser accumulations of odor-producing fat glands than any other animal. One can therefore rightly assume that the odor organ has played a crucial role in designing the way in which we perceive / think the world. You just need to think about how strong and overwhelming emotions some smells that you have not known for a long time can induce. For me personally, it seems to apply mainly to smells and smells with positive associations from my childhood. At the beginning of my work, it appeared as something of an intuitive feeling that the "psychological" view of the brain so strong in the 20th century led us away from the evolutionary self-explanations of thought.

In line with the modern "hygiene", which seems to have the main purpose of concealing body scents and replacing them with artificial, allergies and immune problems increase. If you assume that thinking has a close connection with smells and scents, this is undoubtedly a reflection. Does this also affect us on other levels?

While in his book "The Scented Ape" Michael Stoddart pleads for the fact that man, when she started hunting in flock, would have lost large parts of his odor communication ability due to that the then necessary monogamy was threatened by sexual odor invasions from the females but at the same time one can come up with several alternative scenarios and objections. The "olfactory neck" complexity of man suggests Lex. that something closely related to the odor organ has' driven our intelligence. Lex's dogs. which have recognized good sense of smell, even the very strongly developed "olfactory neck" and therefore the brain's development, except possibly marginally, can be linked to or from simpler degrees of odor detection. In fact, we know quite a bit about the more subtle odor perceptions that man unconsciously occupies.

The connection between intelligence / intellect and its biological anchors can thus appear to be problematic on several levels. This applies inter alia to the connection between sensory impression and abstraction. In a remark about rational reconstruction, Jurgen Haberma makes a distinction between what he calls sensory experience (observation) and communicative experience (understanding). Against this, one can polemise if one sees the thought process as consisting of parts in memory patterns and experiences that must be processed / understood in order to be meaningful at all.

  sees a stone = sight impression as understood by the viewer
  I see a stone = opinion understood by another person

I suppose Habermas sees the latter example as communication because of the purpose (via the language) of the original stone viewer's visual impression of the stone and then to claim that this "extent" of the meaning in the opinion cannot be proved to be of a different nature from the thought / understanding process that lies behind the first example. This understanding of the stone does not differ from the understanding of an abstract symbol like Lex. a letter or a word, written or pronounced. The statement "I see a stone" is likewise a direct impression of mind which, like the stone as an object, lacks all meaning if it is not understood. Here one can object that the word stone in contrast to the phenomenon stone can transmit meanings (symbolic construction according to Habermas). Nevertheless, I would like to insist that this is also apparent and a consequence of our way of perceiving the language and Popper's third world (see below).

A stone can be perceived as everything from the printing ink in a word to an advanced symbolic design. It is not a matter of difference between observation and understanding, but only different, unrelated levels of understanding. Nor does the division "pure observation" and "reflective observation" have any other than purely comparative significance, since any delimitation (other than the purely comparative) does not make sense meaningfully. Doesn't it matter that communication takes place between two conscious, thinking beings? Certainly, Habermas and others are free to elevate communication between individuals to another group than the communication the stone viewer has with himself and his cultural heritage via reflection in the stone, but in this case this is merely an ethnocentric position without relevance to the distinction / observation distinction.

For me, it is therefore not a fundamental difference in the symbol combination in the sensory experience of a stone or of Habermas text. Of course, this does not mean that in any way I would express any kind of valuation of the Habermas or the stone. What it does mean, however, is that I want to question the division of observation / understanding and thus also the division of primitive / civilian thinking. In the name of justice, it should be said that Habara's example is based on a completely different chain of thought with a different purpose than this one mentioned, and that I only want to try to demonstrate the danger of generalizing the relationship between observation / understanding. In other contexts, it becomes almost unnoticed for a linguistic axiom (virus to take information technology as an example) that then both generates and cumulates differences that do not exist.

In the book Evolution of the Brain / Creation of the Self (with preface by Karl Popper), John C. EccIes notes among other things. that: '1t is surprising how slow the growth of World 3 (K. Poppers and J. EccIes division of existence and experiences; World I = physical objects and states, World 2 = states of consciousness, World 3 = knowledge in objective sense) was in the earlier of thousands of years of Homo sapiens sapiens. And even today there are races of mankind with negligible cultural creativity. Only when the societies could provide the primary needs of shelter, food, clothing, and security were able to participate effectively in cultural creativity, so enriching World 3. "

This quote shows Eccle's and Popper's legitimate concerns about the issue and partly the cultural-revolutionary retreat path they use to leave the question. (See the chapter Khoi, San and Bantu in this book) It also reveals a certain, perhaps unconscious, aversion to the idea that societies would voluntarily settle for meeting their "primary needs".
Karl Popper has, with reasons, made himself known as the freedom advocate and here I fully share his attitude. Freedom (implicitly a human and responsible freedom) is a clear deficiency in the modern welfare state. At the same time, it is so that the concept of freedom does not exist at all among the collectors / hunter cultures referred to in this consideration. The concept of freedom, like diamonds, is created only under pressure.


Peter Klevius wrote:


Tuesday, May 15, 2018

Peter Klevius contribution to the AI/consciousness debate.

The thoughts below were first presented 1979-81 in an article and correspondence with Georg Henrik von Wright (Wittgenstein's successor at Cambridge), and later published in a book 1992, a letter to Francis Crick (Salk) 1994, and on the web 2003.

Evolution means change - a fact missed by many neo-creationists*


* Exemplified with the eager "humanifying" of Neandertals etc. extinct creatures. Or the equally eager (not to say desperate) search for a hiding place where "consciousness" can be protected against de-mystifiers such as e.g. Peter Klevius.


In Demand for Resources (1992 ISBN 9173288411) Klevius crossed the boundaries between consciousness-observation-understanding-language and wrapped it all in one, i.e. adaptation.
According to Klevius analysis everything is adaptation. There's no principal analytical difference between how planets adapt to their star or how humans adapt to their environment. And no dude, this is not "simplifying away" or diluting it. When the bedrock of the Indo-Australian Plate met with the bedrock of the Asian plate the landscape was almost flat. However, look at the Himalayas today. Same rock but a completely different and extremely wrinkled appearance and a new name, mountain range.

Consciousness is neither simple nor complicated - and certainly not a "mystery". The real mystery is how people "mystify" it - from Penrose's hiding in quantum tubulars to Koch's escape into the brain's olfactory channels. The former outside falsifiability, and the latter outside any kind of scientific consensus and, more importantly, clearly related to the fact that brain evolution started as a smell organ which later on was mounted with additional gadgets (vision, hearing etc.) connected via Thalamus. In short, as Klevius wrote 1992, this is why olfactory "memories" feel so different. This is also why claustrum is focused towards the olfactory lobes, i.e. functioning as a "translator" and transferer of these signals which weren't originally connected to thalamus at all.

And please, don't get stuck in the frontal lobe just because you find some difference compared to other parts of the brain. The simple reason is just that the frontal lobe happens to be the last expansion in brain evolution and is lacking in non-humans.

The  "mystery" of drivingness - or carness.


An undriving car doesn't move.

A selfdriving car makes intentional decisions based on history and present. These decisions wouldn't be any different with a human driver with exactly the same information available. A surprising looking choice of route may be just based on info npt available for the surprised.


Humans have humanness rather than "consciousness"*


* Humans have skin. So were's the mystery of "skinness"?
According to Peter Klevius (1981, 1992, 1994, 2003) humans have trapped themselves in language and have a borderline problem re. what can be said across the border between humans and "the rest".

In Demand for Resources (1992, ISBN 9173288411), Peter Klevius presented the following - his own (as far as he is aware of) - original observations re. evolution and awareness/mind:

Existence is change - not creation out of nothing.

Among so called "primitive" societies which had had no contact with monotheisms, the very thought that something could appear out of nothing was impossible.

So why did monotheisms come up with such a ridiculous idea? It's very simple. The racist "chosen people" supremacist ideology created a "god" that was not part of the world he (yes, he) had created out of nothing, i.e. making a clean sheet on which the chosen ones could exist (see the chapter Existencecentrism in Demand for Resources, 1992 ISBN 9173288411).

Culture is that (arbitrarily defined and bordered) part of adaptation that is shared by others.


Warning/advise: To better your understanding of Klevius writings you need to realize that he is extremely critical of how concepts are created and used. Not in a stiff/absolute sense of meaning, but rather how concepts may cluelessly (or deliberately) migrate within a particular discourse. So when Dennet talks about "deliberate design" he contrasts it against "clueless design", although such a distinction isn't possible. Evolution is neither clueless nor deliberate. And whatever we are up to it can't be distinguished from evolution other than as a purely human assessment - in which case it can't include evolution. Only humans can evaluate human behavior, which fact renders such evaluations pointless outside the realm of humans. Getting this seems to constitute a main obstacle in debates about AI and singularity.

This is why Klevius always refers to the individual human's negative Human Rights, i.e. everyone we agree is a human. This is also why Klevius can emphasize the Denisova bracelet, genetics etc. finds in Siberia/Altai as proof of modern humans evolving there (with some help from island South East Asia, not in Africa. Most humans living today would have been incapable of intellectually perform the task because the IQ peak has long since been diluted in the mass of humans. We're all one family of humans but the top of the line of human intelligence was a combination of island shrinking brains and its genetic transfrer to big skulled relatives in the north - as Klevius has pointed out since 2004 on the web.

Peter Klevius EMAH update on "consciousness" 2018: 


Acknowledgement: I've never in my life met anyone who I've felt being more intelligent* than I am. This means I've had no reason warshipping human intelligence. And whole my life I've been told it's unfair that I see things faster and clearer than others - or even worse, that I "turn black into white" (some real idiots from the 1970-80s). But how could it be "unfair" when I can't use it for my own advantage without others sooner or later catching up and shaming me? And when you're in the front line no one understands and therefore doesn't pay you. Which fact has added valuable neutrality and reduced malign bias to/from Klevius' analysis.

* Klevius intelligence was perhaps best described by the Finnish neuroscientist, J. Juurmaa, who in the 1990s wrote: "Peter Kleviuksen ajatuksen kulku on ilmavan lennokas ja samalla iskevän ytimekäs" which translated to English would mean something like: "Peter Klevius' thought process is easily eloquent yet simultaneously concisely punchy." This he wrote in a long letter answering Klevius question about the effects on the visual cortex on individuals who have been blind from birth. This inquiry was part of Klevius check up of his already published EMAH theory, so to get a qualified confirmation that the "visual cortex" in born blinds is fully employed with other things than vision. Juurmaa's description of Klevius  is in line with philosopher Georg Henrik von Wright's 1980 assessment, and more importantly with Klevius own experience, and perhaps most importantly when assessing AI/deep learning etc.

Only in true science and Human Rights does Klevius intelligence matter. And with AI singularity "pure" science will be dead anyway (although some idiots will never get it). Why? Because human existencecentrism (look it up in Klevius 1992 book pp 21-22) will only follow AI to the point of singularity.

Peter Klevius has - since he at age 14 read Einstein's and Barnett's book - been fascinated with human aversion of checking themselves in the mirror of existencecentrism.

Future democracy will be cloud based and filtered through (negative) Human Rights equality. This means that we get rid of the distorting bottleneck our politicians now constitute.

This also means the definitive end of islam as we know it, i.e. as a Human Rights violating excuse for racism, sexism, and power greed.

It's astonishing how the avoidance of negative Human Rights affects every debate. And most of this is due to our politicians' defense of the Saudi dictator family. Why? Simply because they stand as the "guardians" of islam and 1.6 Billion muslims which are all lumped together and protected by the label "islamophobia" which in fact only protects the Saudi dictator family and those who want to deal with it and its Human Rights violating sharia(e.g. OIC etc).

There's no way to copy a brain without a total break between individuals. That's perhaps one definition of what it means to be a human.

What makes humans individuals (atoms) and robots collective. Robot memories are shared and if you destroy the hardware, the software will still be alive and well.

However, a human individual is extremely vulnerable to individual extinction.

And a "pet" copy is an other individual - although it remembers and behaves like the original.


Peter Klevius in Demand for Resources (1992:23, ISBN 9173288411):



The basis of existence is change, and causality constitutes a complex of evolution and devolution. Evolution may be seen as the consequence of causality's variables in time where complexity in existing structures are reinforced. This stands in opposition to thermodynamics which theoretically leads to maximal entropy (i.e. energy equilibrium) where time/change finally ends. Someone might then say that the products of evolution are just temporary components in causality's road towards uniformity (Klevius 1981, 1992 - text copied from Klevius 1981 article Demand for Resources).


The Even More Astonishing Hypothesis (EMAH)

by Peter Klevius


1991, years before Crick's book, the original idea was presented for Georg Henrik von Wright (Wittgenstein's own choice of successor at his Cambridge chair), then published in Demand for Resources (1992, ISBN 9173288411), and 1994 presented for Francis Crick and 2004 presented on the world wide web.

Abstract: Consciousness may be seen as environmental adaptation rather than something "uniqely human". Although neo-cortex constitutes the mass of adaptations Thalamus is the least discussed yet perhaps the most important piece in the "puzzle of mind" due to its central function as the main relay station between body actions, brain and environment. A critical assessment of concepts such as: observation/understanding, mind/body, free will, knowledge and language reveals an inescapable awareness in the Thalamic "meet-puts". In conclusion memories hence may be better described as associations causing linguistic traps (i.e. self-inflicted "problems" produced in language) rather than as distinct entities. The continuity model proposed in EMAH avoids the limitations of a "discrete packets of information" model, and without Cartesian dualism or the Homunculus fallacy.

Note. In some respect the neural network of "lower" systems such as the spinal cord and cerebellum by far outperforms the cortex. This is because of different tasks (fast motorics and slow adaptation) and due difference in processing. (Copyright Peter Klevius).


Introduction

Understanding how social behavior and its maintenance in human and other forms of life (incl. plants etc) evolved has nothing to do with “the balance between self interest and co-operative behavior” but all to do with kinship and friendship adaptation. Everything is "self-interest" - how could it not be? Although humans may be attributed a more chaotic (i.e. more incalculable) "personality", they are, like life in general, just adaptive "robots" (i.e. active fighters against entropy – see Demand for Resources, 1992 ISBN 9173288411). Misunderstanding (or plain ignorance of – alternatively ideological avoidance of) kin recognition/friendship (symbiosis), and AI (robotics) pave the way for the formulation of unnecessary, not to say construed, problems which, in an extension, may become problematic themselves precisely because they hinder an open access for direct problem solving (see e.g. Angels of Antichrist – kinship vs. social state).

Mentalists trap themselves in selfinflicted astonishment over phenomenons they think are beyond determinism. When Chomsky says "there are things beyond comprehension" he should ask himself: Who are you to talk about things beyond comprehension (compare 'existencecentrism' in Klevius Demand for Resources, 1992 ISBN 9173288411), i.e. something that can't be asked - without just pushing the border a little - or rather, just a new comprehensible adaptation. And if it seems incomprehensible, it's no more so than e.g. Donald Duck (see below).


The Future of a "Gap" (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

Human: What is a human being? Can the answer be found in a non-rational a priori statement (compare e.g. the axiomatic Human Rights individual) or in a logical analysis of the alleged "gap" between human beings and others? The following analysis uses an "anti-gap" approach. It also rests on the struggle and success of research performed in the field of artificial intelligence (AI), automation/robotics etc.

Signal: A "signal gap" is commonly understood as a break in the transition from input to output, i.e., from perception to behavior. Mentalists use to fill the gap with "mind" and "consciousness" while behaviorists don't bother because they can't even see it. A five minute timelaps of Earth spanning 4.5 Billion years would make a very lively planet. However, where's "consiousness" between input (the single frames) and output (the running video)? Or, what/whom should we allow to possess "consciousness"? And if we limit it only to humans we are stuck with it being just a human thing - hence impossible to use in general meaning. An easier way out is to avoid the signal "gap" and call it what it is, a network. But a network that continuously builds new patterns on top of already existing ones. 

Matter: Berkeley never believed in matter. What you experience is what you get and the rest is in the hand of "God" (i.e. uncertainty). This view makes him a super-determinist without "real" matter. Klevius just adds the fact that Berkeley's "God" is truly metaphysical and therefore not worthy of even talking about.

Mind: The confusing mind-body debate originated in the Cartesian dualism, which divides the world into two different substances, which, when put together, are assumed to make the world intelligible. However, on the contrary, they seem to have created a new problem based on this very assumption. But a problem that has become popular among those who want to talk metaphysics, i.e. giving an impression of talking about what can't be talked about.

Free will: Following a mind-body world view, many scholars prefer to regard human beings as intentional animals fueled by free will. It is, however, a challenging task to defend such a philosophical standpoint. Not even Martin Luther managed to do it, but rather transferred free will to God despite loud protests from Erasmus. Although Luther's thoughts in other respects have had a tremendous influence on Western thinking, this particular angle of view has been less emphasized. However, 'free will' can only be used locally.

Future: When asked about the "really human" way of thinking, many mentalists refer to our capacity to "calculate" the future. But is there really a future out there? All concepts of the future seem trapped in the past. We cannot actually talk about a certain date in the future as real future. What we do talk about is, for example, just a date in a calendar. Although it is a good guess that we are going to die, the basis for this reasoning always lies in the past. The present hence is the impenetrable mirror between the "real future" and ourselves. Consequently, every our effort to approach this future brings us back in history. Closest to future we seem to be when we live intensely in the immediate present without even thinking about the future. As a consequence the gap between sophisticated human planning and "instinctual" animal behavior seems less obvious. Is primitive thinking that primitive after all? And isn't 'instinct' just an excuse for ignorance?

An additional aspect of future is that neither youth, deep freezing or a pill against aging will do as insurance for surviving tomorrow. The human individual is lost in a crash whereas the robot brain safely hovers in the cloud - in many copies.


Observation and Understanding (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

If one cannot observe something without understanding it, all our experiences are illusions because of the eternal string of corrections made by later experience. What seems to be true at a particular moment may turn out to be something else in the next, and what we call understanding is merely retrospection.

The conventional way of grasping the connection between sensory input and behavioral output can be described as observation, i.e. as sensory stimulation followed by understanding. The understanding that it is a stone, for example, follows the observation of a stone. This understanding might in turn produce behavior such as verbal information. To do these simple tasks, however, the observer has to be equipped with some kind of "knowledge," i.e., shared experience that makes him/her culturally competent to "understand" and communicate. This understanding includes the cultural heritage embedded in the very concept of a stone, i.e.it's a prerequsite for observation. As a consequence it's not meaningful to separate observation and understanding. This, of course, doesn't exclude "local" (non-analytical) use of the terms in speech and literature etc. for the purpose of catching subtle nyances.

Categorization belongs to the language department, which, on the brain level, is only one among many other behavioral reactions. But due to its capability to paraphrase itself, it has the power to confuse our view on how we synchronize our stock of experience. When we watch a stone, our understanding synchronizes with the accumulated inputs associated with the concept of a stone. "It must be a stone because it looks like a stone," we think. As a result of such synchronization, our brain intends to continue on the same path and perhaps do something more (with "intention"). For example, we might think (as a result of our adaptation to the situation), "Let's tell someone about it." The logical behavior that follows can be an expression such as, "Hey look, it's a stone out there." Thus, what we get in the end is a concept of a stone and, after a closer look, our pattern of experience hidden in it. If the stone, when touched, turns out to be made of paper maché, then the previous perception is not deepened, but instead, switched to a completely new one.

It's almost frightening how often one hears researchers/scientists/philosophers etc. who think they are at least average in intelligence, telling others that "previously we didn't understand what X was", for example that "water consists of molecules and atoms". This kind of schizophrenic "thinking" reflects the depth of the mind/body hoax many are trapped in.

One might say that a stone in a picture is a "real" stone, while the word 'stone' written on a piece of paper is not. The gap here is not due to different representations but rather to different contexts. When one tries to equalize observation with understanding, the conventional view of primitive and sophisticated thinking might be put in question. We still act like complex worms, and sophistication is only a matter of biased views built on different stocks of experience (adaptaion) and the overwhelming complexity that appears chaotic. Moreover, a worm, just like a computer, is more than the sum of its parts.

Therefore, meaning, explanation and understanding are all descriptions of the same basic principle of how we synchronize (adapt) perception with previous experience. For the fetus or the newborn child, the inexperienced (unsynchronized, or uncertainty/"god" if you prefer) part of the inside-outside communication is huge compared to a grown up. Hence the chaotic outside world (i.e., the lack of its patterns of meaningfulness) has to be copied (adapted) in a stream of experience, little by little, into the network couplings of the brain. When the neural pattern matches the totality (meaningfulness) its information potential disappears. Our brain doesn't store information - it kills information. From an analytical point of view "storing of information" is an oxymoron. On top of this, there is a continuous growth of new neurons, which have to be connected to the network. As a result of these processes, the outside world is, at least partly, synchronized with the inside, "mental" world. Heureka, the baby appears to think and exist! In other words, the baby records changes against a background of already synchronized (adapted) inputs.

* see "existence-centrism" in Demand for Resources (1992) for a discussion abt a shrinking god and the allmighty human!


The Category of the Uniquely Human Category Mistake (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

It's meaningless to state that we are the best (or the worst) humankind. However, category mistakes re. humans and non-humans are still common and many researchers/scientists don't even seem to realize how carelessly they handle this important distinction.

It's equally meaningless to ask what something is that we don't know what 'it' is. 'Consciousness' is easily understood when used in comparison with 'unconcious'. However, how stupid is it when we mystify the term beyond comprehension by squeezing in random additional properties and then ask the question: What is this mystery with consciousness".

A main difficulty in formulating the concept of consciousness is our pride (presumably we should have been equally proud as mice) and our tautological belief in "something uniquely human", However, if we try to follow the die-hard determinists, we would find free will and destiny easier to cope with, and also that the concept of "the unique human being" is rather a question of point of view and carelessly crossing borders of concepts.

Following this line of thought, I suggest turning to old Berkeley as well as to Ryle but excluding Skinnerian Utopias. Those who think the word determinism sounds rude and blunt can try to adorn it with complexity to make it look more chaotic. Chaos here means something you cannot overview no matter how deterministic it is. We seem to like complexity just because we cannot follow the underlying determinism. The same could be said about what it really is to be a human? A passion for uncertainty, i.e. life itself. Francis Crick in The Astonishing Hypothesis: "... your sense of personal identity and free will are in fact no more than the behavior of a vast assembly of nerve cells and their associated molecules."

This statement is easy to agree on, so let me continue with another, perhaps more useful, quote from Crick: "Categories are not given to us as absolutes. They are human inventions." I think these two statements create an efficient basis for further investigations into the mystery of thinking. Hopefully you will forgive me now as I'm going to abolish not only memory but also free will and consciousness altogether. Then, I will go even one step further to deny that there are any thoughts (pictures, representations, etc.) at all in the cortex. At this point, many might agree, particularly regarding the cortex of the author of this text.

The main problem here is the storage of memories, with all their colors, smells, feelings and sounds. Crick suggests the dividing of memory into three parts: episodic, categorical and procedural. While that would be semantically useful, I'm afraid it would act more like an obstacle in the investigation of the brain, because it presupposes that the hardware uses the same basis of classification and, like a virus, hence infects our analyses.

The analysis presented here is the result of de-categorization. The only thing that distinguishes us from the rest of nature (and 'nature' includes all artefacts, non-human as well as human ones) is the structure and complexity most (but not all) humans possess. In other words, there's no point at which something "special" happens. This is why Klevius in 1994 said that there's no principal difference between a brick and his girlfriend - which comment rose the eyebrow on his pal who admired Klevius girlfriend.

Instead of categorization, this analysis sees only adaptation to the surrounding world incl. one's own brain, which condtitutes of layers of previous adaptations where the latest one is awareness, consciousness, or the present now if you like.


Nerves, Loops and "Meet-puts" (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

According to Crick, "each thalamic area also receives massive connections from the cortical areas to which it sends information. The exact purpose of these back connections is not yet known." In the following paragraphs, I will outline a hypothetical model in line with this question. The interpretation of the interface between brain and its surrounding as it is presented here has the same starting point as Crick's theory but divides thinking into a relay/network system in the cortex and the perception terminals (or their representatives in the thalamus) around the body like an eternal kaleidoscope. Under this model, imagination would be a back-projected pattern of nerve signals, associated to the original events that caused them but with the signals faded and localized as "internal" based on direction of nerve signals. This view suggests that there are not only inputs and outputs but also whst one might name "meet-puts," i.e., when an input signal goes through and evolves into other signals in the cortex, these new signals meet other input signals in the thalamus.

There is no limit to the possible number of pattern/association in such a system, and there is no need for memory storage but rather, adaptive network couplings. These "couplings," or signal pathways, are constantly running in loops (not all simultaneously but some at any given moment, i.e. e.g. what we call awareness) from the nerve endings in our bodies through the network in the cortex and back again to the thalamus. Of course the back-projected signals have to be discriminated from incoming signals, thereby avoiding confusion regarding fantasy and reality. But this process, though still unknown, could be quite simple and perhaps detected simply based on the direction where it comes from. As a consequence of the loops, the back-projected pattern differs from the incoming signals, or the stimuli. Therefore, every signal from the body/perceptions, hormonal signals and so on, either finds its familiar old route or pattern of association in the network (established/adapted experiences) or creates new connections (new experiences) that can be of varying durability depending on how they settle with older associations. For example, if someone is blind from the moment of birth, s/he will have normal neuronal activity in the cortex area of vision. On the other hand, in case of an acquired blindness, the level of activity in the same area will become significantly lower over time. This is logical according to the EMAH model because, in the former case, the neurons have never become involved in association patterns of vision but were engaged in other tasks. In the latter case, the neurons have partly remained in previous vision patterns, which are no longer in use, while the rest has moved onto other new tasks.

It is important to note that human thinking, contrary to what today's computers do, involves the perceptions that originate from the chemical processes in the body's hormonal system, what we carelessly name "emotions." This, I think, is the main source behind the term "human behavior." The difference between man and machine is a source of concern but, as I see it, there is no point in making a "human machine". But perhaps someone might be interested in building a "human-like machine".


Body vs. Environment - a History of Illusions (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

The surface of our body isn't the border of consciousness. A better candidate is the neuronal system/Thalamus.

According to the EMAH model, nerves define our body. Thus, our hormonal signals inside our body can be viewed as belonging to the environment surrounding the nerveous system. As the meaning of life is to uphold complexity by guarding the borders, it's ultimately a fight against entropy. In this struggle, life is supported by a certain genetic structure and metabolism, which synchronizes its dealings (adaptation) with the surrounding environment. Balancing and neutralizing these dealings is a job done by nerves. Also consider Klevius gut bacterias with brain.

A major and crucial feature of this "body-guarding" mechanism is knowing difference in the direction between incoming signals and outgoing, processed signals. On top of this, both areas change continuously and thus have to be matched against each other to uphold or even improve the complexity. According to this model, people suffering from schizophrenia, just like healthy people, have no problem in discriminating between inputs and outputs. In fact, we can safely assume that the way they sometimes experience hallucinations is just like the way we experience nightmares. Both hallucinations and nightmares seem so frightening because they are perceived as incoming signals and confused as real perceptions. The problem for the schizophrenic lies in a defect in processing due to abnormal functions in and among the receptors on the neurons, which makes the association pattern unstable and "creative" in a way that is completely different compared with controlled fantasies. In the case of nightmares, the confusion is related to low and fluctuating energy levels during sleep. However, a frightful hallucination is always real because it is based on perceptions. What makes it an illusion is when it is viewed historically from a new point of view or experienced in a new "now," i.e., weighed and recorded as illusory from a standpoint that differs from the original one. In conclusion, one may argue that what really differentiates a frightful ghost from a harmless fantasy is that we know the latter being created inside our body, whereas we feel unsure about the former.



EMAH Computing as Matched Changes (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

EMAH does not support the idea that information is conveyed over distance, both in the peripheral and central nervous system, by the time of occurrence of action potential?

"All we are hypothesizing is that the activity in V1 does not directly enter awareness. What does enter awareness, we believe, is some form of the neural activity in certain higher visual areas, since they do project directly to prefrontal areas. This seems well established for cortical areas in the fifth tier of the visual hierarchy, such as MT and V4." (Crick & Koch, 1995a,b).  Hardware in a computer is, together with software (should be “a program” because this word signals programming more directly), specified at the outset. A high level of flexibility is made possible through the hardware's ability to unceasingly customize to incoming signals. This is partly what differs human beings from a machine. The rest of the differentiating factors include our perceptions of body chemistry such as hormones, etc. Programming a computer equipped with flexible hardware, i.e., to make them function like neurons, will, according to the EMAH-model, make the machine resemble the development of a fetus or infant. The development of this machine depends on the type of input terminals.

All input signals in the human, including emotional ones, involve a feedback process that matches the incoming signals from the environment with a changing copy of it in the form of representations (or rather adaptations) in the brain's network couplings. Life starts with a basic set of neurons, the connections of which grow as experiences come flooding in. This complex body of neuronal connections can be divided into permanent couplings, the sum of experiences that is your "personality," and temporary couplings, short-term more shallow "memories"/imprints for the time being.

A certain relay connection, if activated, results in a back-projected signal toward every receptor originally involved and thus creates, in collaboration with millions of other signals, a "collage" that we often call awareness. This is a constant flow and is in fact what we refer to as the mysterious consciousness. At this stage, it is important to note that every thought, fantasy or association is a mix of different kinds of signals. You cannot, for example, think about a color alone because it is always "in" or "on" something else (on a surface or embedded in some kind of substance) and connected by relay couplings to other perceptions or hormonal systems. "Meaning" is thus derived from a complex mix of the loops between perceptions and back-projected perceptions. This can be compared to a video camera system with a receiving screen and a back-projecting screen. The light meter is the "personality" and the aperture control the motor system. However, this system lacks the complex network system found in the cortex and thus has no possibility to "remember"/adapt. The recorded signal is of course not equivalent to the brain's network couplings because it is fixed. To save "bytes," our brains actually "forgets" what has been synchronized (adapted) rather than "remember" it. Such changes in the brain - not memories - are what build up our awareness. This process is in fact a common technique in transmitting compressed data. It's also similar to how we first actively learn to walk, and then stop thinking about it.


Short-Term Memories and Dreams (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

At any given moment, incoming signals, or perceptions, have to be understood through fitting and dissolving in a network of associations. If there are new, incomprehensible signals, they become linked (coupled) to the existing net and localized in the present pattern of associations. Whether their couplings finally vanish or stay depends on how they fit into the previous pattern and/or what happens next.

As a consequence of this coupling process - a process that could be described rather as a flow - memories in a conventional, semantic meaning do not exist, because everything happens now. Consciousness or awareness is something one cannot influence, but rather, something that involves an ongoing flow of information to and from nerve endings through the brain (a relay station incl. Thalamus). For every given moment (now) there is consequently only one possible way of acting, i.e. no absolute "free will". One cannot escape awareness or decisions because whatever one thinks, it is based on the past and will rule the future. Memories are thus similar to fantasies of the future, based on and created by experiences. Regarding short-term memory, I agree with Crick's view and hypothesis. But I certainly would not call it memory, only weaker or vanishing superficial couplings between neurons. Remember that with this model, the imagination of something or someone seen a long time ago always has to be projected back on the ports were it came through and thus enabling the appropriate association pattern. Although signals in each individual nerve are all equal, the back-projected pattern makes sense only as a combination of signals. The relay couplings in the cortex is the "code," and the receptor system is the "screen." Because this system does not allow any "escape" from the ever changing "now" which determines the dealings with the surrounding environment. Living creatures develope their software by living.

Dreams are, according to this model, remnants of short-term memories from the previous day(s), connected and mixed with relevant patterns of associations but excluding a major part of finer association structures. This is why dreams differ from conscious thinking. The lack of finer association structures is due to low or irregular activity levels in the brain during sleep. The results are "confused thoughts", which are quite similar to those of demented people, whose finer neural structures are damaged because of tissue death due to a lack of appropriate blood flow. Thus dreams are relevantly structured but in no way a secret message in the way psychoanalysts see them, whereas patients with dementia tend to go back to their childhood due to the irrevocable nature of the physical retardation process. Investigating dreams and their meaning by interpreting them is essentially the same as labeling them as psychological (in a psychoanalytical sense). A better and less biased result would emerge if the researcher actually lived with the subject the day before the dream occurred. Rather than analyzing pale and almost vanished childhood experiences from a view trapped in theoretical prejudices that describe an uncertain future, the researcher should perhaps put more efforts in the logic of the presence.





Donald Duck and a Stone in the Holy Land of Language (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

Wittgenstein: "Sie ist kein Etwas, aber auch nicht ein Nichts!" (Phil. Untersuch. 304). Also see P. Klevius' analysis of a stone (in Demand for Resources - on the right to be poor, 1992).

Although Wittgenstein describes language as a tool it seems more appropriate to classify it as human behavior. Unlike tools language is a set (family) of a certain kind of bodily reactions (internal and/or towards its environment). We have to reject, not only the grammar which tries to force  itself on us", but also, and perhaps even more so, representations we, without any particular reason, assign to language.

Language is basically vocal but apart from that, little has been said about its real boundaries. One could actually argue that the best definition is perhaps the view that language is human territory. The question whether animals have a language is then consequently meaningless. On the other hand, Wittgenstein denied the existence of a "private language" because applying it could never prove the validity of its products. We are trapped in words and connotations of language although these categories themselves, like language in general, are completely arbitrary "language games," as Wittgenstein would have put it. (no offense, Mr Chomsky and others, but this is the tough reality for those trying to make sense of it in the efforts of constructing intelligent, talking computers). Furthermore, these categories change over time and within different contexts with overlapping borders.

Changing language games provide endless possibilities for creating new "language products", such as e.g. psycho-dynamic psychology. I believe this is exactly what Wittgenstein had in mind when he found Freud interesting as a player of such games but with nothing to say about the scientific roots of the mental phenomenon.

Let's imaging Donald Duck and a picture of a stone. Like many psychological terms, Donald Duck is very real in his symbolized form but nonetheless without any direct connection to the reality of the stone. In this sense, even the word stone has no connection to reality for those who don't speak English. Words and languages are shared experience.

It is said that a crucial feature of language is its ability to express past and future time. This might be true but in no way makes language solely human. When bees arrive to their hive they are able, in symbolic form, to express what they have seen in the past so that other bees will "understand" what to do in the future. Naming this an instinct just because bees have such an uncomplicated brain does not justify a different classification to that of human thinking.

If, as I proposed in Demand for Resources (1992), we stop dividing our interaction with the surrounding world in terms of observation and understanding (because there is no way of separating them), we will find it easier to compare different human societies. Language is a categorizing extension of perception/experience patterns and discriminates us as human only in the sense that we have different experiences.

Language has developed from a tool for communication to an additional tool of deception within itself. In Demand for Resources (1992 ISBN 9173288411) I used the example of a stone that turned out to be papier mache, as well as the word existence which has transformed from emerge to exist, i.e. loosing its root and hence opening up for the question how we can exist.

However, words and language are just like everything else that hits our receptors. There is no principle difference in thinking through the use of words or through sounds, smells (albeit not through thalamus), pictures or other "categories". Ultimately, language is, like other types of communication with the surrounding world, just a form of adaptation to one's environment (in a broad sense of course), i.e. resistance against entropy.



Wikipedia: Language is a system that consists of the development, acquisition, maintenance and use of complex systems of communication, particularly the human ability to do so.
Human language has the properties of productivity and displacement, and relies entirely on social convention and learning. Its complex structure affords a much wider range of expressions than any known system of animal communication. Writing is a medium of human communication that represents language and emotion with signs and symbols.

This short "definition" reveals the meaninglessness of the definition.



It's important to note the difference between everyday use of language, and language used about itself.

What's the difference between an image of a distant galaxy taken via a space telescope, or smell molecules left on a path?

And long before humans realized how nature performs photosynthesis, they already thought of themselves as the masters of Universe.

And unlike what Chomsky and others say, Klevius doesn't think in language other than when preparing to answer someone through language. Is this why Klevius is a lousier talker than most early teenagers who don't have a clue about what Klevius is talking about?

Words constitute rigid traps when compared to free, smoothly running thinking/analysis - unless you're gambling with words, as Freud did while waiting for reality to catch up with his speculations we call psychoanalysis (see Klevius Psychosocial Freud timeline.

However, words are also so unprecise that they are useless for construction work etc. where we need math and geometry instead. Words describe what it is and math how it is.

Everyday language needs its greatest asset, volatility, which simultaneously constitutes its main security risk re. faking/misleading communication.

To define it more narrowly, language is also the room where psychoanalysis is supposed to live and work. A stone does not belong to language, but the word "stone" does. What is the difference? How does the word differ from the symbolic expression of a "real" stone in front of you? Or if we put it the other way round: What precisely makes it a stone? Nothing, except for the symbolic value derived from the word "stone." The term "observation" thus implicates an underlying "private language. When Turing mixed up his collapsing bridges with math, he was corrected by Wittgenstein, just as Freud was corrected when he tried to build psychological courses of events on a fantasy of natural science. Wittgenstein's "no" to Turing at the famous lecture at Cambridge hit home the difference between games and reality.

Archetypes and grammar as evolutionary tracks imprinted in our genes is a favorite theme among certain scholars. But what about other skills? Can there also be some hidden imprints that make driving or playing computer games possible? And what about ice hockey, football, chess, talk shows, chats and so on? The list can go on forever. Again, there is no distinguishing border between evolutionary "imprints" (i.e. adaptation) and other stimulus/response features in ordinary life.


"Primitive" vs. "Sophisticated" Thinking (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

The more synchronized (informed) something or someone is with its surrounding reality, the less dynamics/interest this something or someone invests in its relationship with that particular reality. Interest causes investment and social entropy excludes investment economy because economy is always at war against entropy. The key to economic success is luck and thus includes lack of knowledge. No matter how well a business idea is outlined and performed, the success or lack of success is ultimately unforeseeable.In Demand for Resources I discussed the possibility of some serious prejudice hidden in Karl Poppers' top achievement of civilization, namely the "World 3" and his and Eccles' assumption of an increasing level of sophistication from the primitive to the modern stage of development. It is of course easy to be impressed by the sophistication of the artificial, technical environment constructed by man, including language and literature, etc. But there is nonetheless a striking lack of evidence in support of a higher degree of complexity in the civilized human thinking than that of e.g. Australian Aboriginals, say 25,000 years ago. Needless to say, many hunting-gathering societies have been affluent in the way that they have food, shelter and enough time to enrich World 3, but in reality they have failed to do so.

Even on the level of physical anthropology, human evolution gives no good, single answer to our originality. What is "uniquely human" has rested on a "gap," which is now closed, according to Richard Leakey and Roger Lewin, among others. This gap is presumably the same as the one between sensory input and behavioral output mentioned above.From an anthropological point of view, it can be said that a computer lacks genetic kinship, which, however, is a rule without exception in the animate world, although we in the West seem to have underestimated its real power.


De-constructing the Mind (copyright P. Klevius 1992-2004)

A deconstruction of our underlying concepts of the brain can easily end up in serious troubles due to the problem with language manipulation. Wittgenstein would probably have suggested us to leave it as it is. If language is a way of manipulating a certain area - language - then the confusion will become even greater if we try to manipulate the manipulation! But why not try to find out how suitable "the inner environment" is for deconstruction? After all, this environment presupposes some kind of biology at least in the border line between the outside and the inside world. Are not behavioral reactions as well as intra-bodily causes, e g hormones etc. highly dependent on presumed biological "starting points"? How does skin color or sex hormones affect our thinking? Where do causes and reactions start and isn't even the question a kind of explanation and understanding?

Determinists usually do not recognize the point of free will although they admit the possible existence of freedom. Why? Obviously this needs some Wittgensteinian cleaning of language. Unfortunately I'm not prepared for the task, so let's pick up only the best looking parts, i.e. that words as freedom, will, mind, etc., are semantic inventions and that they have no connections to anything else if not proved by convincing and understandable evidence. Does this sound familiar and maybe even boring? Here comes the gap again. Stimuli and response seen purely as a reflex/adaptation is not always correct, says G. H. von Wright, because sometimes there may be a particular reason causing an action. According to von Wright, an acoustic sensation, for example, is mental and semantic and thus out of reach for the scientific understanding of the body-mind interaction. Is this a view of a diplomatic gentleman eating the cake and wanting to keep it too? To me, it is a deterministic indeterminist's view.

G. H. von Wright concludes that what we experience in our brain is the meaning of its behavioral effects. In making such a conclusion that it is rather a question of two different ways of narrowing one's view on living beings von Wright seems to narrow himself to Spinoza's view. Is meaning meaningful or is it perhaps only the interpreter's random projection of him/herself? Is it, in other words, based only on the existence of the word meaning?

Aristotle divided the world primarily into matter and definable reality (psyche). As many other Greek philosophers, Aristotle was an individualist and would have fitted quite well in the Western discourse of today. Berkeley, who was a full-blood determinist, however recognized the sameness in mind and matter and handed both over to "god". Consequently Philonous' perceived sensations in the mind were not directly aligned with Hylas view of immediate perceptions. We thus end up with Berkeley as a spiritual die-hard determinist challenging materialistic humanism.


Conclusion
                                                                            
In conclusion one might propose a rethinking of the conventional hierarchy of the brain. What we use to call "higher levels", perhaps because they are more pronounced in humans, are in fact only huge "neural mirrors" for the real genius, thalamus (and its capability of two-way communication with the cortex and extensions in the cerebellum, spine, nerv ends etc), i.e. what is part of the "primitive" system. In other words, one may propose a view describing the "gap" between humans and animals as a quantitative difference in the amount/power of cerebral "mirroring" and communication with thalamus, rather than as a distinct qualitative feature. Nothing, except our "emotions", seems to hinder us from making a "human machine". And because these very "emotions" are lived experience (there is, for example, no way to scientifically establish what could be considered "emotions" in a fetus) nothing, except the meaninglessness in the project itself, could hinder us from allowing a machine to "live" a "human life".

Monday, February 24, 2020

Why is Google interfering with Peter Klevius defense of women's Human Rights?!


Why did Google - wittingly or unwittingly - doctor this image by Peter Klevius which defends women's Human Rights?! Is it for the purpose of protecting islamic sharia from criticism? 


As you can see the first and last lines are cut off from the original text that asks: 'Should women have sharia or Human Rights? Attractive but inferior, or fully human?'





 This is what you get on a 'sex segregation klevius' image search onGoogle.

Here's the very same original image from the posting.
Peter Klevius photo and drawing from 1979.

Peter Klevius has always (both in his scientific writings as well as in his practical life) argued for the abolishment of sex segregation/apartheid

Peter Klevius has for the whole of his adult life been defending women's full Human Rights in accordance with the 1948 Universal Human Rights declaration (which islam rejects) and therefor also been against sex segregation. Peter Klevius has always said that women should have the freedom to lead their lives as they wish without having to excuse their bodies (i.e. without having to use or be named by labels such as Tomboy, lesbian, transsexual etc.). In Peter Klevius Utopia everyone is a human and free to act as they like without hormones, surgery  etc. So Peter Klevius has no other problem with LGBT+ except that he feels it's unfair that they instead of having the freedom to lead their lives as they wish, they now need to go through a lot of struggle just to satisfy unfounded and ever changing cultural gender expectations.

Peter Klevius, the world's foremost expert on sex segregation (sad, isn't it) again had to correct the widespread confusion between 'sex' and 'gender'. This map shows that it's islam that stands for sex segregation. However, Peter Klevius is 100% sure that it's not based on thoughts in the head of the students, but rather the form of genitals etc. bodily features usually assessed at birth.

Peter Klevius respects everyone's freedom to fashion as they like. However, deliberately offensive or oppressive supremacist markers reveal disrespect against Human Rights. As an example in this context one may point to islamic sharia "chastity" markers such as the veil, niqab etc. which actually may signal to other women that they are less worthy. In other words, if the clothing is connected to islamic sharia instead of a personal fashion choice.And if a muslim woman makes such a choice not connected to islam/sharia but purely on personal grounds, well, then she really blurres the meaning of it and contradicts the purpose of non-islamic fashion.

Peter Klevius wrote:

Friday, October 26, 2018

Klevius, the world's foremost expert on sex/gender issues (sad isn't it), demands a stop for in sane cultural sex segregation that hurts and violates Human Rights.


The ambigous use of 'gender' for the purpose of upholding sex segregation/apartheid is the real culprit behind many suicides and destroyed lives.


Klevius drawing from 1979 (background photo by Klevius 2012): Human Rights rather than religion

A legal definition of sex as "a biological, immutable condition determined by
genitalia at birth" is proposed in US. What could possibly be clearer than that? And why hasn't it been there all the time?!

This definition says nothing about cultural gender restrictions. And the fact that it's also supported by in sanely religious "communities" shouldn't stain it.



The insidious "socially constructed roles and behaviors typically (sic) ascribed to men and women" is like the Spanish inquisition.


However, when it comes to gender the American medical community currently recognizes a distinction between sex -- a classification based on bodily characteristics, internal and external -- and gender, the socially constructed roles and behaviors typically ascribed to men and women.

It also recognizes that no single aspect of sex or gender defines a person's gender identity -- their internal sense of gender, which may not match the sex assigned to them at birth.

So "behaviors typically ascribed to one sex" aren't allowed but demand hormonal, surgical etc. change of biology instead of human society stopping the sexist "typically ascribed roles and behaviors" of "mainstream" culture.

Under the 1948 Universal Human Rights declaration there's no room whatsoever to command rights and behavior in accordance to sex - no matter how "typical" such sexism is.

And when you have digested this, then take a new reading of what Klevius has tried to teach you throughout his adult life, namely understanding heterosexual attraction.

Klevius hates* the concept "sexual identity" but if he's necessitated to use it it would mean that his only "sexual isentity" is heterosexual attraction and that women's only possible "sexual identity" is as possible receivers of "the male gaze". Every other form of sexuality can be performed or imagined by any person no matter of sex.

* The concept of "sexual identity" is an oxymoron introduced via sociology and theoretical feminism for the sole purpose of keeping up old fashioned sex segregation. As Klevius wrote in Warning for Feminism (1998): When sex segregation in real life vanishes, cultural sex segregation is reinforced by those who seek political etc. power out of it - well knowing that women in most areas have been in a backward position due to classical sex segregation due to child rearing etc., and that many women have felt embarrassed about lacking competence in many "male activities" and therefore an easy target for the proposal of not admitting it but rather call it "feminine behavior". 


Klevius wrote:

Tuesday, April 28, 2015


Bruce Jenner becomes a cultural lesbian because of sex segregation


Bruce Jenner says he becomes a cultural woman - but is still sexually attracted to biological women

He changes his body with hormone therapy and he continues calling himself he. Why? Klevius has the answer further down.

Will Toril Moi accept Bruce as a "woman"?


Bruce Jenner can never have a make up that makes him a biological woman. Not even if he manages to get rid of his heterosexual attraction capacity. Is this masquerade (for whom?) intended to culturally over compensate a biological lack? Why? Who denies Bruce Jenner the right to be as he is unless he masquerade himself into a mirage of "a woman" that simultaneously contributes to the restraints put on young girls via rigid cultural sex segregation? 

 Sometimes ago in Sweden many (most?) persons wearing a dress on a Monday were not biological women.

Toril Moi: I'm not a cultural woman writer but I write like a biological man can not.


Klevius explains: Toril wants to free her writings from the category of women writers ("not to conform to some stereotypical norm for
feminine writing") while simultaneously make sure that she can write in a way a man can not. In other words, like all other true feminists she is a fanatic defender of sex segregation. And like Luce Irigaray, she is probably just a sex politician waiving the affirmative sword - in a way that continuously hurts young girls, for the sake of defending own or women's in general backwardness - which is due to hers and Moi's continuing of historical sex segregation/apartheid.



Sex change is biologically impossible and "gender" or, more properly, sex segregation isn't biological but cultural

Klevius "gender" and sex tutorial


"Sexual Orientation" and "Gender Identity" defined from the perspective of Heterosexual Attraction

Forcing people into a rigid (yet simultaneously completely arbitrary) sex segregation through the creation of "gender identity" categories is a violation against the 1948 Human Rights declaration according to which sex shouldn't matter. How people look and behave changes all the time and varies between communities as well as between individuals. Sex segregation is therefore pure intolerance, i.e. a form of racism. And no, you idiots who think de-sex segregation means giving dresses and dolls to boys, you're very wrong. De-sex segregation means stopping mounting girls with dresses and dolls to an extent that robs them of their possibilities compared to boys.

Dear reader, as you already know, due to a complete lack of competition Klevius is the world's formost expert on sex and sex segregation (sad isn't it). This fact makes it understandably sometimes confusing for you because of the corresponding complete lack of "peer reviewers" who could boost your confidence in what Klevius is saying. However, as you already know, even if there were supporting "peer reviewers" Klevius would never trust them (i.e. in accordance with his scientific methodology which rests on a relentless pursuit of self criticism). So here's some logic instead:


Sexual orientation - why does it matter outside sexuality? It doesn't!

There exists only one meaningful "sexual orientation" and that is heterosexual attraction, i.e. what makes males sexually interested in females. The means for heterosexual attraction vary from bees transporting male pollen, to male fishes getting horny at the sight/smell of eggs left by female fishes, all the way to human males getting excited by female curvature. A male's physical attraction to the opposite sex (not "gender"). "Women" "gay" and "lesbian" are terms indicating lack of this heterosexual attraction in their sexual activities (which fact of course doesn't exclude that male "gays" can have heterosexual attraction activities outside their "gay" activities). 

Sexual activities which lack the element of heterosexual attraction simply have nothing to do with sex dichotomy. A so called heterosexual couple may well perform sexual acts without heterosexual attraction whereas a man may well be heterosexually attracted to a transvestite etc because he thought it was a biological woman - until he finds out.

Gender identity is a hoax term made up for the purpose of guarding sex segregation.

Gayatri Spivak's strategic essentialism (i.e. sex segregation) was meant to signal that while huge intragroup differences may exist, it is important to strategically bring forward a simplified ‘essentialised’ group identity.  "I saw the insane division between Hindus and muslims. This is what makes the idea of including religion in politics and faith-based activism so inconceivable for me." Klevius agrees about this latter part. However, the insane division between Women and Men locks half the population in rigid yet unpredictable cultural fashion groups while islam, on top of this, locks all of us in a similar sharia muslims/Human Rights infidels dichotomy.


Were Bruce Jenner's wives lesbian?


Chrystie Scott, Bruce Jenner's first wife: "It's so hard to wrap your head around it, particularly because he was such a manly man. He never indicated anything feminine in his demeanor. However, it didn't threaten our relationship. It wasn't really a problem,"

Klevius: Indeed, why would it! Who made it a problem? And if you thought of him as "such a manly man" while he actually was a "feminine woman", doesn't it confirm that you didn't know him at all and that you indeed were a lesbian in your love relation to Bruce? He said he has the "soul of a female" even though he was born with male body parts.

Linda Thompson, Bruce Jenner's second wife: "He can finally realize his need to be who he authentically is, who he was born to be. I have respectfully kept his secrets private and would have taken his confidences to my grave had he not spoken out. He can finally realize his need to be who he authentically is, who he was born to be."

However, Linda Thompson also wrote that she would not have married Jenner if she had known about his "gender issue" when they first met. But she's glad she didn't know because she would have missed the chance to share a life with him.
Looking back, I'm so grateful to God, the universe, and Bruce that I didn't know, and that Bruce played the role in my life that he did."

Klevius: Would you believe it! He was the perfect guy for her yet when he put dissonating words (or clothes etc) on it she got scared.

The two met in 1979 at the Playboy Mansion (a house built on a foundation of heterosexual attraction and some silicon), and married on January 5, 1981, and moved to Hawaii.

"The Bruce I knew back then was an easygoing, down-to-earth, casual, romantic, good and loving man. I was extremely happy to have found such a remarkable partner with whom to share my life. I found him to be honorable and, well, just too good to be true. Just too good to be true indeed. The Bruce I knew back then was unstudied, affable, and seemingly very comfortable in his own skin. So it seemed."

Klevius: The big questions are: 1 Why did he do anything? and 2 Why did his sex segregated masquerade affect you so much back then when you applaud it today?

Jenner told her in 1985 that "he identified as a woman" and hoped to move forward with the process of becoming a woman." Confused and desperate, Thompson suggested therapy to overcome or fix it."

They separated after the failed six months therapy and Jenner began taking female hormones and removing face and body hair. He then started developing breasts.

She hopes people will remember him as "world's greatest athlete, who became trailblazer for the civil rights of the transgender community."

Klevius: He is a trailblazer for the Human Right not to be restricted by one's sex. However, his method is over ambitious and he might lose some of his heterosexual attraction instinct.


How to differentiate between the "soul of a female" and the "soul of a man"?


Toril Moi: I try to answer two questions: Why did the question of the woman writer disappear from the feminist theoretical agenda around 1990? Why do we need to reconsider it now? I then begin to develop a new analysis of the question of the woman writer by turning to the statement ‘I am not a woman writer’. By treating it as a speech act and analysing it in the light of Simone de Beauvoir’s
understanding of sexism, I show that it is a response to a particular kind
of provocation, namely an attempt to force the woman writer to conform
to some norm for femininity. I also show that Beauvoir’s theory illuminates Virginia Woolf’s strategies in A Room of One’s Own before, finally, asking why we, today, still should want women to write.

If there is a difficulty with Woolf’s view, it is that she argues as if it were
always wrong to write as if one were a woman. In the end, the danger of
identifying with the despised category, namely femininity, is more terrify-
ing to her than the danger of having to pretend to be entirely genderless.
That she feels this way, is surely Professor von X’s fault.

However, here's Klevius' Virginia Woolf (extracted from his PhD thesis):


Virginia Woolf on heterosexual attraction


Virginia Woolf: "Why are women... so much more
interesting to men than men are to women?"

According to Virginia Woolf ‘all this pitting of sex against sex, of quality against quality; all this claiming of superiority and imputing of inferiority belongs to the private-school stage of human existence…’ (1928: 21).

Woolf’s androgyny and Bloomsbury’s sexual liberalism can be traced to nineteenth and early twentieth century science and individuals such as Richard von Krafft-Ebing, Edward Carpenter, Havelock Ellis, Otto Weininger, and Sigmund Freud, who all maintained the theory of a third sex in which masculine and feminine characteristics (drawn of course along the lines of biological essentialist binary thought) unified in a single body (Wright 2002: 1-4).

Woolf’s androgyny has been interpreted in a variety of ways. However, ‘Woolf distilled a purer essence from the concept than contemporary critics tend to do. Androgyny, for Virginia Woolf, was a theory that aimed to offer men and women the chance to write without consciousness of their sex – the result of which would ideally result in uninhibited creativity’ (Wright 2007: 1 & 4). The function of Woolf’s androgyny would ideally be to provide ‘a third term that neutralises the gendered way in which the subject is constructed.’ Woolf’s androgyny was assigned to sex instead of settling down into the sexual polarisation it is designed to avoid. We may then read androgyny as either liberation for women, as a bisexuality to which women are closer than men, or the result of the split that continually takes place in female consciousness due to sex segregation (Wright 2007: 4).

Ultimately, according to Wright, Woolf’s androgyny implied a way of thinking that would enable women and men to write as themselves, ‘still in a sexed body, but without the attendant prejudices and discriminations that are connected to the body by society’ (Wright 2007: 8), i.e. what here is termed sex segregation. In Wright’s words:

‘For Woolf, the enemy of androgynous thinking was summed up in the Victorian age which forced writers into a consciousness of their sex and led to the production of abortive works deformed by sexual self-awareness…. How do women avoid writing as women constructed by patriarchy, or avoid writing like men in the service of patriarchy?’ (Wright 2007: 9-10)

For Woolf, ‘androgyny is the capacity of a single person of either sex to embody the full range of human character traits, despite cultural attempts to render some exclusively feminine and some exclusively masculine.’ The ability to access this ‘full range of character traits’ and subject positions so that we read and write as ‘fully human men and women’ is the ideal that Woolf is chasing (Wright 2007: 16). This is an answer to the question whether women understand heterosexual attraction. They do not, if we are to rely on Virginia Woolf and this author’s interpretation of her writings. But why should they indeed? For Woolf the answer is given in the form of an androgynous fully human being.


In my view, says Toril Moi, if a woman’s vision of the world is strongly marked by her gender, that is surely as potentially interesting as if it is not. The whole point, after all, is to avoid laying down requirements for what a woman’s writing must be like. Every writer will have to find her own voice, and her own vision. Inevitably, a woman writer writes as a woman, not as a generic woman, but as the (highly specific and idiosyncratic) woman she is.

Gayatri Spivak suggests that whilst such labels as false, we need to continue to use them as an operational necessity.

It can be just as frustrating for a woman writer to feel that she has to
write as a generic human being, since this opens up an alienating split
between her gender and her humanity.

Klevius: And that "alienating split" is in fact the gate to real emancipation.






Klevius wrote:


Thursday, March 14, 2013


Klevius sex and gender tutorial


Klevius quest of the day: What's the difference between the Pope and Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg?


Klevius hint: It's all about 'not sameness' and Human Rights! Human Rights IS 'sameness' stupid!


When God was created he was made like Adam.

When the basic idea of Universal Human Rights was created it was made like Adam AND Eve.

And for you who think heterosexual attraction, i.e. that women are sexier than men, could be (exc)used as a reason for depriving women of legal sameness. Please, do think again!And read Klevius Sex and Gender Tutorial below - if you can!




                           The Plan of God


A Cardinal, a Pope and a Justice "from medieval times"





Keith O'Brien has reiterated the Catholic Church's continued opposition to civil partnerships and suggested that there should be no laws that "facilitate" same-sex relationships, which he claimed were "harmful", arguing that “The empirical evidence is clear, same-sex relationships are demonstrably harmful to the medical, emotional and spiritual wellbeing of those involved, no compassionate society should ever enact legislation to facilitate or promote such relationships, we have failed those who struggle with same-sex attraction and wider society by our actions.”

Four male members of the Scottish Catholic clergy  allegedly claim that Keith O'Brien had abused his position as a member of the church hierarchy by making unwanted homosexual advances towards them in the 1980s.

Keith O'Brien criticized the concept of same-sex marriage saying it would shame the United Kingdom and that promoting such things would degenerate society further.


Pope Francis, aka Jorge Bergoglio: Same-sex is a destructive pretension against the plan of God. We are not talking about a mere bill, but rather a machination of the Father of Lies that seeks to confuse and deceive the children of God." He has also insisted that adoption by gay and lesbian people is a form of discrimination against children. This position received a rebuke from Argentine president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, who said the church's tone was reminiscent of "medieval times and the Inquisition".




Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg: 'Sex' is a dirty word, so let's use 'gender' instead!


Klevius: Let's not!


As previously and repeatedly pointed out by Klevius, the treacherous use of 'gender' instead of 'sex' is not only confusing but deliberately so. So when Jewish Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg proposed gender' as a synonyme for 'sex' (meaning biological sex) she also helped to shut the door for many a young girl's/woman's possibilities to climb outside the gender cage.

The Universal Human Rights declaration clearly states that your biological sex should not be referred to as an excuse for limiting your rights.







Islam (now represented by OIC and its Sharia declaration) is the worst and most dangerous form of sex segregation - no matter in how modern clothing it's presented!


Klevius Sex and Gender Tutorial

What is 'gender' anyway?


(text randomly extracted from some scientific writings by Klevius)


 It might be argued that it is the developing girl, not the grown up woman, who is the most receptive to new experience, but yet is also the most vulnerable. Therefore we need to address the analysis of the tyranny of gender before the point at where it's already too late.  I prefer to use the term ‘female’ instead of ‘woman’ so to include girls, when appropriate in this discussion. I also prefer not to define women in relation to men, i.e. in line with the word 'universal' in the Human Rights Declaration. In short, I propose 'gender blindness' equally as, for example, 'color blindness'. And keep in mind, this has nothing to do with biological differences.

According to Connell (2003:184), it is an old and disreputable habit to define women mainly on the basis of their relation to men. Moreover, this approach may also constitute a possible cause of confusion when compared to a definition of ‘gender’ which emphasizes social relations on the basis of ‘reproductive differences’.

To really grasp the absurdity of Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg's and others habit of confusing 'gender' with 'sex' one may consider that “normal” girls/women live in the same gender trap tyranny as do transsexuals.

The definition of ‘acquired gender’ is described in a guidance for/about transsexuals as:

Transsexual people have the deep conviction that the gender to which they were assigned at birth on the basis of their physical anatomy (referred to as their “birth gender”) is incorrect. That conviction will often lead them to take steps to present themselves to the world in the opposite gender. Often, transsexual people will undergo hormonal or surgical treatment to bring their physical identity into line with their preferred gender identity.

This evokes the extinction of the feminine or women as directly dependent on the existence of the masculine or men. Whereas the feminine cannot be defined without the masculine, the same applies to women who cannot be defined - only described - without men.

Female footballers, for example - as opposed to feminine footballers, both male and female - are, just like the target group of feminism, by definition distinguished by sex. Although this classification is a physical segregation – most often based on a delivery room assessment made official and not at all taking into account physical size, strength, skills etc. - other aspects of sex difference, now usually called ‘gender’, seem to be layered on top of this dichotomy. This review departs from the understanding that there are two main categories that distinguish females, i.e. the physical sex belonging, for example, that only biological women may participate in a certain competition, and the cultural sex determination, for example that some sports or sporters are less ‘feminine’ than others.

‘Gender’ is synonymous with sex segregation, given that the example of participation on the ground of one’s biological sex is simply a rule for a certain agreed activity and hence not sex segregation in the form of stipulated or assumed separatism. Such sex segregation is still common even in societies which have prescribed to notions of general human freedom regardless of sex and in accordance with Human Rights. This is because of a common consensus that sex segregation is ‘good’ although, as it is seen here, its effects are bad in the long run.

In Durkheim’s (1984: 142) view ‘organized despotism’ is where the individual and the collective consciousness are almost the same. Then sui generis, a new life may be added on to that of the main body. As a consequence, this freer and more independent state progresses and consolidates itself (Durkheim 1984: 284).

However, consensus may also rest on an imbalance that is upheld and may even strengthen precisely as an effect of the initial imbalance. In such a case ‘organized despotism’ becomes the means for conservation. As a consequence, the only alternative would be to ease restrictions, which is something fundamentally different from proposing how people should live their lives. ‘Organized despotism’ in this meaning may apply to gender and to sex segregation as well.

According to Connell (2003) whose confused view may be closer to that of Justice Ginsburg, gender is neither biology, nor a fixed dichotomy, but it has a special relation to the human body mirrored in a ‘general perception’. Cultural patterns do not only mirror bodily differences. Gender is ‘a structure’ of social relations/practices concentrated to ‘the reproductive arena’, and a series of due practices in social processes. That is, gender describes how society relates to the human body, and has due consequences for our private life and for the future of wo/mankind (Connell 2003:21-22). However, the main problem here involves how to talk without gender.

Sex should properly refer to the biological aspects of male and female existence. Sex differences should therefore only be used to refer to physiology, anatomy, genetics, hormones and so forth. Gender should properly be used to refer to all the non‑biological aspects of differences between males and females ‑ clothes, interests, attitudes, behaviors and aptitudes, for example ‑ which separate 'masculine' from 'feminine' life styles (Delamont 1980: 5 in Hargreaves 1994:146).

It seems that 'masculine' and 'feminine’ in this definition of gender is confusingly close to the ‘mystique about their being predetermined by biology’ when compared to the ‘reproductive arena’ and ‘reproductive differences’ in Connell’s definition of gender. However, although gender, according to Connell (2003: 96), may also be ‘removed’ the crucial issue is whether those who are segregated really want to de-sex segregate? As long as the benefits of a breakout are not clearly assessable, the possible negative effects may undermine such efforts.Hesitating to run out through an opened door to the unknown doesn't necessarily mean that you don't want to. Nor does it mean that you have to.

According to Connell (2003:20) the very key to the understanding of gender is not to focus on differences, but, instead, to focus on relations. In fact, this distinction is crucial here because relations, contrary to differences, are mutually dependent. Whatever difference existing between the sexes is meaningless unless it is connected via a relation. On the one hand, big male muscles can hardly be of relational use other than in cases of domestic violence, and on the other hand, wage gaps cannot be identified without a comparative relation to the other sex.

Biological determinism is influential in the general discourse of sports academia (Hargreaves 1994:8). However, what remains to analyze is whether ‘gender’ is really a successful concept for dealing with biological determinism?

‘To explain the cultural at the level of the biological encourages the exaggeration and approval of analyses based on distinctions between men and women, and masks the complex relationship between the biological and the cultural’ (Hargreaves 1994:8).

With another example: to explain the cultural (driver) at the level of the technical (type of car) encourages the exaggeration and approval of analyses based on distinctions between cars, and masks the complex relationship between the car and the driver. However, also the contrary seems to hold true;. that the cultural (driver/gender) gets tied to the technical/biological. The ‘complex relationship’ between the car and the driver is easily avoided by using similar1 cars, hence making the driver more visible. In a sex/gender setting the ‘complex relationship’ between sex and gender is easily avoided by distinguishing between sex and culture2, hence making culture more visible. The term ‘culture’, unlike the term ‘gender’ clearly tries to avoid the ‘complex relationship’ between biology and gender. The ‘complex relationship’ makes it, in fact, impossible to distinguish between them. On top of this comes the ‘gender relation’ confusion, which determines people to have ‘gender relations’, i.e. to be opposite or separate.

This kind of gender view is popular, perhaps because it may serve as a convenient way out from directly confronting the biology/culture distinction, and seems to be the prevalent trend, to the extent that ‘gender’ has conceptually replaced ‘sex’, leading to the consequence that the latter has become more or less self-evident and thus almost beyond scrutiny. In other words, by using ‘gender’ as a sign for ‘the complex relationship between the biological and the cultural’, biological determinism becomes more difficult to access analytically.

The distinction between sex and gender implied in these quotations, however, does not seem to resolve the issue, precisely because it fails to offer a tool for discriminating biological aspects of differences from non-biological ones, i.e. those that are cultural. This is also reflected in everyday life. ‘Folk’ categories of sex and gender often appear to be used as if they were the same thing. Although 'masculine' and 'feminine' are social realities, there is a mystique about their being predetermined by biology. Furthermore the very relational meaning of ‘gender’ seems to constitute a too obvious hiding place for a brand of essentialism based on sex. Apart from being ‘structure’, as noted above, gender is, according to Connell (2003:20), all about relations. However, if there are none - or if the relations are excluding - the concept of sex segregation may be even more useful.

In Connell’s analysis, gender may be removed (Connell 2003:96). In this respect and as a consequence, gender equals sex segregation. In fact it seems that the 'masculine' and 'feminine’, in the definition of gender above, are confusingly close to the ‘mystique about their being predetermined by biology’ when compared to the ‘reproductive arena’ and ‘reproductive differences’ in Connell’s (2003:21) definition of gender. The elusiveness of gender seems to reveal a point of focus rather than a thorough-going conceptualization. So, for example, in traditional Engels/Marx thinking the family’s mediating formation between class and state excludes the politics of gender (Haraway 1991: 131).


What's a Woman?


In What is a Woman? Moi (1999) attacks the concept of gender while still emphasizing the importance of the concept of the feminine and a strong self-conscious (female) subject that combines the personal and the theoretical within it. Moi (1999: 76), hence, seems to propose a loose sex/gender axis resting on a rigid womanhood based on women’s context bound, lived experience outside the realm of men’s experience.

Although I share Moi’s suggestion for abandoning the category of gender, her analysis seems to contribute to a certain confusion and to an almost incalculable theoretical abstraction in the sex/gender distinction because it keeps maintaining sex segregation without offering a convincing defence for it. Although gender, for example, is seen as a nature-culture distinction, something that essentializes non-essential differences between women and men, the same may be said about Moi’s approach if we understand her ‘woman’ as, mainly, the mainstream biological one usually classified (prematurely) in the delivery room. If the sexes live in separate spheres, as Moi’s analysis seems to imply, the lived, contextual experience of women appears as less suitable for pioneering on men’s territory.

This raises the question about whether the opening up of new frontiers for females may demand the lessening or even the absence of femininity (and masculinity). In fact, it is believed here that the ‘liminal state’ where social progression might best occur, is precisely that. Gender as an educated ‘facticity’ then, from this point of view, will inevitably enter into a state of world view that adds itself onto the ‘lived body’ as a constraint.

It is assumed here that we commonly conflate constructs of sex, gender, and sexuality. When sex is defined as the ‘biological’ aspects of male and female, then this conceptualization is here understood as purely descriptive. When gender is said to include social practices organized in relation to biological sex (Connell 1987), and when gender refers to context/time-specific and changeable socially constructed relationships of social attributes and opportunities learned through socialization processes, between women and men, this is also here understood as descriptive. However, when description of gender transforms into active construction of gender, e.g. through secrets about its analytical gain, it subsequently transforms into a compulsory necessity. Gendering hence may blindfold gender-blind opportunities.

In conclusion, if gender is here understood as a social construct, then it is not coupled to sex but to context, and dependent on time. Also it is here understood that every person may possess not only one but a variety of genders. Even if we consider gender to be locked together with the life history of a single individual the above conceptualization makes a single, personal gender impossible, longitudinally as well as contemporaneously. Whereas gender is constructive and deterministic, sex is descriptive and non-deterministic. In this sense, gender as an analytical tool leaves little room for the Tomboy.


The Tomboy - a threat to "femininity"


Noncompliance with what is assumed ‘feminine’ threatens established or presumed sex segregation. What is perceived as ‘masculinity’ or ‘maleness’ in women, as a consequence, may only in second place, target homosexuality. In accordance with this line of thought, the Tomboy embodies both the threat and the possibilities for gendered respectively gender-blind opportunity structures.

The Tomboy is the loophole out of gender relations. Desires revealed through sport may have been with females under the guise of a different identity, such as that of the Tomboy (Kotarba & Held 2007: 163). Girls throw balls ‘like girls’ and do not tackle like boys because of a female perception of their bodies as objects of action (Young 2000:150 cited in Kotarba & Held 2007: 155).

However, when women lacking experience of how to act in an effective manner in sport are taught about how to do, they have no problem performing, quite contrary to explaining shortcomings as due to innate causes (Kotarba & Held 2007: 157). This is also opposite to the experiences of male-to-female transsexuals who through thorough exercise learn how to feminize their movements (Schrock & Boyd 2006:53-55). Although, according to Hargreaves (1994), most separatist sports philosophies have been a reaction to dominant ideas about the biological and psychological predispositions of men and women, supposedly rendering men 'naturally suited to sports, and women, by comparison, essentially less suited (Hargreaves 1994:29-30), the opposite may also hold true. Separatism per definition needs to separate and this separation is often based on biological differences, be it skin colour, sex or something else.

From this perspective, the Tomboy would constitute a theoretical anomaly in a feminine separatist setting. Although her physical body would possibly qualify as feminine, what makes her a Tomboy would not.

The observation that in mixed playgrounds, and in other areas of the school environment, boys monopolize the physical space (Hargreaves 1994:151) may lack the additional notion that certain boys dominate and certain boys do not. Sports feminists have 'politicized' these kinds of experience by drawing connections between ideas and practice (Hargreaves 1994:3) but because of a separatist approach may exclude similar experience among parts of the boys. Moreover, a separatist approach is never waterproof and may hence leak Tomboy girls without a notion.


Femininity and feminism


Feminism and psychoanalysis as oppressors

According to Collier and Yanagisako (1987), Henrietta Moore (1994) and other feminist anthropologists, patriarchal dominance is an inseparable socially inherited part of the conventional family system. This implicit suggestion of radical surgery does not, however, count on unwanted secondary effects neither on the problem with segregated or non-segregated sex-worlds. If, in other words, oppression is related to gender segregation rather than patriarchy, or perhaps that patriarchy is a product of sex segregation, then there seems to be a serious problem of intellectual survival facing feminists themselves (Klevius in Angels of Antichrist 1996). If feminism1 is to be understood as an approach and/or analytical tool for separatism2, those feminists and others who propose not only analytical segregation but also practical segregation, face the problem of possible oppression inherent in this very segregation (Klevius 1994, 1996). In this sense oppression is related to sex segregation in two ways:

1. As a means for naming it (feminism) for an analytical purpose.
2. As a social consequence or political strategy (e.g. negative bias against, for example, female football or a separatist strategy for female football).

It is notable that the psychoanalytic movement has not only been contemporary with feminism, but it has also followed (or led) the same pattern of concern and proposed warnings and corrections that has marked the history of ‘feminism’ in the 20th century. According to S. Freud, the essence of the analytic profession is feminine and the psychoanalyst ‘a woman in love’ (L. Appignanesi & J. Forrester 1992:189). But psychoanalytically speaking, formalized sex and sex segregation also seem to have been troublesome components in the lives of female psychoanalysts struggling under a variety of assumed, but irreconcilable femininities and professional expectations.

In studying the history of feminism one inevitable encounters what is called ‘the women’s movement’. While there is a variety of different feminisms, and because the borders between them, as well as to what is interpreted as the women’s rights movement, some historians, incl. Klevius, question the distinction and/or methods in use for this distinction.

However, it could also be argued that whereas the women’s rights movement may be distinguished by its lack of active separatism within the proposed objectives of the movement, feminism ought to be distinguished as a multifaceted separatist movement based on what is considered feminine values, i.e. what is implied by the very word ‘feminism’3. From this perspective the use of the term ‘feminism’ before the last decades of the 19th century has to be re-evaluated, as has every such usage that does not take into account the separatist nature underpinning all feminisms worth carrying the name. Here it is understood that the concept ‘feminism’, and its derivatives, in every usage implies a distinction based on separating the sexes - e.g. addressing inequality or inequity - between male and female (see discussion above). So although ’feminism’ and ‘feminisms’ would be meaningless without such a separation, the ‘women’s rights movement’, seen as based on a distinct aim for equality with men in certain legal respects, e.g. the right to vote, could be described as the opposite, i.e. de-sex segregation, ‘gender blindness’ etc.

As a consequence the use of the word feminism in a context where it seems inappropriate is here excepted when the authors referred to have decided to do so. The feminist movement went back to Mary Wollstonecraft and to some French revolutionaries of the end of the eighteenth century, but it had developed slowly. In the period 1880 to 1900, however, the struggle was taken up again with renewed vigour, even though most contemporaries viewed it as idealistic and hopeless. Nevertheless, it resulted in ideological discussions about the natural equality or non-equality of the sexes, and the psychology of women. (Ellenberger 1970: 291-292).

Not only feminist gynocentrists, but also anti-feminist misogynists contributed with their own pronouncements on the woman issue. In 1901, for example, the German psychiatrist Moebius published a treatise, On the Physiological Imbecility of Woman, according to which, woman is physically and mentally intermediate between the child and man (see Ellenberger 1970:292). However, according to the underlying presumption of this thesis, i.e. that the borders between gynocentrism and misogyny are not well understood, these two approaches are seen as more or less synonymous. Such a view also confirms with a multitude of points in common between psychoanalysis and feminism. As was argued earlier, the main quality of separatism and ‘complementarism’ is an insurmountable border, sometimes contained under the titles: love, desire etc.


Tuesday, July 22, 2014


Which one is weirder, Klevius (the main world critic of sex segregation/apartheid*) or sex apartheid?


* Admittedly Klevius seems also still to be the only one addressing the core issue of this monumental world problem. However, this fact is no more surprising than the fact that we live in a world where every girl has to assign herself to long hair, make up, "feminine" clothing etc cultural "femininity". And if she doesn't then she has to excuse herself by labeling herself a lesbian, a transexual etc or be labeled by others as "suffering" from the invented mental pathology of "gender dysphoria".


What is sex segregation - and what is it not?


According to soft brained Wikipedia: Sex segregation is the physical, legal, and cultural separation of people according to their biological sex. This is distinct from gender segregation, which is the separation of people according to social constructions of what it means to be male versus female.

According to hard brained Klevius: Sex segregation is the physical, legal (e.g. Sharia), and cultural separation of girls/women from boys/men according to social constructions of what it means to be male versus female.

Gender segregation is an impossible term in this context because the separation of people according to social constructions of what it means to be male versus female resides inside the brain not outside the body and can therefore not be called segregation. Segregation is the action or state of setting someone apart from other people or being set apart. In other words, segregation can only be imposed on you from outside with or without your consent. You cannot segregate yourself. Moreover, segregation implies a collective, not individual, action.



According to Carmen Hamilton (apparently a soft brained lawyer):  We’re born as either male or female and, generally, are raised to look and act as our society expects men and women to look and act (sic).

If a radical (sic) approach to eliminate gender segregation were adopted, we would see the complete eradication of gender segregation in all aspects of life. There would no longer be men’s and women’s washrooms, sports, or communal change rooms.

Still, a move to eradicate systemic gender segregation, would inevitably have fallout that would need to be addressed. There are legitimate safety concerns behind some gender segregation. Physical and sexual violence suffered by women at the hands of men continues to be a sad reality. It is difficult to see how women prisoners will be adequately protected if sex segregation is eliminated in prisons.

It also begs the question about whether we can eliminate sex segregation when we have not yet achieved gender equality (sic). Would such a movement nullify the gains fought for by feminists over the last century? There was a time when it was seen as a huge win for women in trades when employers were required to provide separate washrooms for women. Further, we cannot ignore the physiological differences between men and women that put women at a disadvantage in many sports. We would likely see far fewer female Olympians.

Klevius comment: 'We are generally raised to look and act as our society expects men and women to look and act' is a meaningless tautology because 'generally' and 'our society' both have the same meaning. Moreover, Carmen Hamilton seems to be deeply confused when she uses sex segregation and gender segregation as synonyms. What do your invisible gender thoughts in your brain have to do with physical threats from men? Isn't it your biological sex (or your signaling of a female body) that is visible, not your gender.

And why a 'radical elimination of segregation'? What's that anyway?! What would radical Human Rights mean? Would it mean that there exist some moderate Human Rights according to which just a little torture is ok?!

And why can't we have female prisons, washing rooms etc?  It has nothing to do with sex segregation/apartheid. We have parking spots for disabled people but not for women. And why can't women continue running 100 m separate from men? We don't call other effects of physical sex differences sex segregation either. Carmen Hamilton seems to seriously mix apples and pears on this topic. She represents a dangerous view that blurs women's right to full Human Rights equality.

Carmen Hamilton also asks 'whether we can eliminate sex segregation when we have not yet achieved gender equality'. What a non sense! 'Gender equality' is an oxymoron in many sense but here mainly because sex segregation is the opposite to "gender equality"! In other words a catch 22.

LGBT people have "gender rights" but 11-year old football girls have none (see below).

Klevius' sex tutorial: The problem with main stream* feminism is its "equal but different" separatism

* Folks, there are two main types of 'feminism' out there: One that is academic and based on segregation/separatism/apartheid (e.g. muslim feminism), and one that could be described as folk "feminism", i.e. the erroneous belief that feminism stands for equal rights when it in fact stands for separatism.

'Heterosexual attraction' is the only analytical concept you need - yet no one seems to use it as such except Klevius


The feminist fallacy of the double failure not to recognize heterosexual attraction while simultaneously keeping up sex segregation

Heterosexual attraction is the evolutionary logarithm that underpins heterosexual reproduction.

The only heterosexual human is a heterosexual man. If you don't understand/recognize this simple fact then you, just like feminists, have no say at all in discussions about Human Rights and the adverse effect of sex segregation.

Heterosexual attraction in humans resides in the male brain as the female body. Not the other way round. As a consequence only men can have heterosexual sex.

All men and women are different but equal according to Human Rights. However, according to feminists, only men and women are different from a rights perspective. So when Moi uses some 500 pages to tell us that only women, not men, can have women's experience, we can waive her next deep thought namely that women are different from other women.

Ever thought about why Mideast happened to be the birthplace of the most disgusting of cumber stones on humanity's road to Universal Human Rights (including women)? In Demand for Resources Klevius established the root origin of "general" sex segregation as connected to the transition from hunting/gathering to investment a la the neolithic revolution.

However, pure institutionalized sexism, i.e. sex segregation as apartheid, was born out of particular secondary circumstances and effects of sex segregation in the commerce between the new forms of production. The main birthplace for true sexism was Mideast due to its geographical location.You don't have sex religions in China, Japan etc.

When men traded and therefore travelled around, women became even more segregated than they were in the farming society where they at least had a daily contact over the sex barrier. Combine this development with slavery and defense against slavery and you end up with "the chosen people" whose survival was the institutionalized Vagina gate and whose (im)morality was sanctioned by "God".



Slowing down the process of de-sex segregation at an 'all deliberate speed' while treating sex segregation symptoms with hormones and surgery


'All deliberate speed' was a phrase used in the Supreme Court’s decision in Brown v. Board of Education, which declared the system of legal segregation unconstitutional. However,  the Court ordered only that the states end segregation with ‘all deliberate speed', i.e. to weigh something in the balance.

Grace Kelly Bermudez is the plaintiff in a suit, which alleges Colombia’s military service requirement is discriminatory insofar as it only considers assigned sex — typically determined at birth by the presence of absence of external sex organs — and not gender identity – a 'lived internal and individual experience'.

While the military service requirement only applies to men, there is currently no statute governing cases of transsexuals who were assigned a restricting sex at birth and due to sex segregation weren't allowed to lead their lives as they wished.

Gender, as opposed to sex, is a “lived internal and individual experience,” according to an amicus brief filed on Bermudez’s behalf.

Trans persons’ ability to 'construct their gender in a determining fashion' is an implicit part of their “individual autonomy as human beings', an interpretation the Constitutional Court agreed with, argues the brief, when it ruled that all Colombians have the right to 'freely' define their 'association with any particular gender, as well as romantic orientation toward others.'

As a consequence it is argued that the current military exemption practice violates Bermudez’s 'right to gender identity and all related rights by denying her construction of identity, leading to the violation of her privacy, personhood, and right to live free of humiliations', reads the brief.

Klevius comment: So wrong! It is sex segregation that denies the construction of an identity that partly or fully falls outside this segregation, leading to the violation of privacy, personhood, and right to live free of humiliations etc. And sex segregation is already dismissed in the 1948 Human Rights declaration. Why not simply stick to Human Rights rather than upholding a ridiculous sex apartheid.


Jeff and Hillary Whittington presented a video showing little Ryland's female-to-male transition




Klevius comment: You can't possibly be born with a 'gender'. The popularity of LGBT rhetorics is largely due to the defense of sex segregation/apartheid. So ironically, LGBT people's fight for the freedom to lead their lives as they wish simultaneously restricts the playroom for non-LGBT girls and women. Again, Klevius simple answer is to empower girls'/women's Human Right to lead their lives without restrictions because of their sex. And if people don't stop bullying them then why not criminalize such bullying as a hate crime. That would in no time make people equally cautious as they are now about saying anything about muslims, wouldn't it.


John D. Inazu, associate professor of law at Washington University School of Law, an expert on the First Amendment freedoms of speech, assembly, and religion: In less than three decades, the Supreme Court has moved from upholding the criminalizing of gay conduct to affirming gay marriage. The tone of the debates has also shifted. Views on gender and sexual conduct have flip-flopped. Thirty years ago, many people were concerned about gender equality, but few had LGBTQ equality on their radar. Today, if you ask your average 20-year-old whether it is worse for a fraternity to exclude women or for a Christian group to ask gay and lesbian members to refrain from sexual conduct, the responses would be overwhelmingly in one direction.

Luke Brinker (in Bill O'Reilly's Dangerous Parenting Advice For Transgender Kids): O'Reilly has also encouraged parents to actively force their transgender children to conform to gender stereotypes.

Klevius: So it's not a 'gender stereotype' when 'activities and clothing more commonly associated with boys' is enough to deem a girl on a path toward physiological manipulation of her body rather than give her the right to perform these activities without sex apartheid.

Jack Drescher, a member of the APA subcommittee working on the revision of DSM: 'All psychiatric diagnoses occur within a cultural context.

Klevius comment: So when DSM 15 is out, can the male to female trans get their penis back, please?

Homosexuality was diagnosed in the DSM as an illness until 1973, and conditions pertaining to homosexuality were not entirely removed until 1987.
The new term 'gender dysphoria'  implies a temporary mental state rather than an all-encompassing disorder, a change that blurs the picture even more.

Shannon Minter, legal director of the National Center for Lesbian Rights: 'Having a diagnosis is extremely useful in legal advocacy. We rely on it even in employment discrimination cases to explain to courts that a person is not just making some superficial choice ... that this is a very deep-seated condition recognized by the medical community.'

Klevius comment: The only deep-seated condition in this appalling symptom of sex segregation  is the medical community and money.

Mental health professionals who work with trans clients are also pushing for a revised list of symptoms, so that a diagnosis will not apply to people whose distress comes from external prejudice, adults who have transitioned, or children who simply do not meet gender stereotypes.



Why is the sex segregated bullying of girls like Moa Thambert supported when it should, in fact, be classified as a hate crime?!







Parents used to shout 'boy' at me, says now 16-year old Moa Thambert.

Moa Thambert, 16, has always had short hair cut and been tough on the football pitch.

Moa Thambert, 16: It took me hard to be called a boy. Is still in the back of my head. As a child I didn't understand why they wanted to segregate me. But now I understand that it was because I dare to take my place and that I have a certain appearance. It makes me really sad.

When Moa was six she begun playing football and immediately got comments about her "inappropriate" sex appearance. 'It's so sick because there is no difference in how kids look like. One should really be careful not to do so. It strikes very hard.It shouldn't need to be like that.






Pia Sundhage (Sweden's football lady number one and former US coach): It's appalling. In the 1960s I had to pretend to be a boy to be allowed playing in a football team.

Pia Sundhage refers to a recent Swedish football tournament (Fotbollsfesten) for kids where 11-year old girls in Glumslövs FF/Lunds BK were accused of being boys by leaders and parents from Åhus IF.

Åhus IF coaches  were so aggressive and got the whole team with them, says
Jens Lindblom, father of 11-year old Agnes.

The girls cried while the sex abuse continued.


Klevius concluding comment: I've even written a PhD thesis about exactly  this (including in depth interviews with Pia Sundhage and other important female football personalities from the 1940s and on). However. now I want to publish my findings for the general public but hesitate to do so due to the slim interest (or is it just deep ignorance) in this the biggest of global questions. Football/soccer is the sport that seems to best reveal the medieval thinking about sex segregation.

Any hints on how to make the book more popular than this blogging?

And why isn't the whole world reading Klevius?

Anyone?




Some previous reflexions on the topic:


The shameful contamination of British universities with religious fanatism




Guardian:  The University of Leicester has launched an investigation into gender segregation (sic) at a public lecture held by its student Islamic society.

    The talk, entitled Does God Exist?, featured a guest speaker Hamza Tzortzis as part of an Islamic Awareness week. Seating at the event was segregated, with different entrances into the lecture theatre for men and women. . .

    In Leicester, more than 100 students attended the segregated event, which took place last month. A photograph passed to the Guardian shows signs put up in a university building, directing the segregation.

    A message on the group’s website says: “In all our events, [the society] operate a strict policy of segregated seating between males and females.” The statement was removed after the Guardian contacted the society.


Klevius comment: Again this confused and irrational oxymoron 'gender segregation'. The sign on the wall of Leicester University clearly states 'males' and 'females'. It means biological sex, not cultural gender!



Rupert Sutton, from the campus watchdog Student Rights: There is a consistent use of segregation by student of islamic societies across the country. While this may be portrayed as voluntary by those who enforce it, the pressure put on female students to conform and obey these rules that encourage subjugation should not be underestimated.

Klevius: Although islam is by far the worst culprit when it comes to sex apartheid, there is also a consistent low level general use of sex segregation "light" across the world. While this may be portrayed as voluntary by those who enforce it, the pressure put on females (not the least by other females) to conform and obey to sex segregation that encourages subjugation should not be underestimated.




 Leicester University is one of the world's most sexist (i.e. islamized) universities. You may not believe me but the truth is (an other professor witnessed it) that a female professor, Barbara Misztal (an East European immigrant? as BBC uses to put it), when presented with criticism against islam's rejection of women's full Human Rights via Sharia, said "Why don't you want to let women lead their lives as they wish". Yes, you got it right. She saw Sharia restrictions of women's rights as a right! Why hasn't anyone taught her that impositions are not rights, and that Human Rights don't hinder muslim women from choosing to live under these impositions whereas Sharia denies them the choice to freedom. Moreover, she also blamed the messenger for not allowing women to NOT HAVE THEIR FULL RIGHTS!

Barbara Misztal's  female students need to know this, and as usual, it seems that Klevius is the only one daring to really address this ultimate and extremely disastrous and even dangerous sexism.




Sharia sex segregation or Human Rights for girls/women?



In every possible form of Sharia girls/women are forced to lead their lives in sex apartheid of varying degrees. And that includes OIC's all muslims covering Sharia law via UN. But according to Human Rights every girl/woman has the right to decide herself what kind of life she wants to lead - incl. a sex segregated life if she so wishes. So to live in a society where Sharia rules doesn't really give any fair options.

In islam women and non-muslims are all "infidels", and the only thing that really distinguishes a woman as muslim is her "duty" towards islam to reproduce (physically and/or culturally) as many new muslims as possible - and of course to have the Sharia duty to serve as a sex slave for her muslim husband.

Isn't that funny, muslims need a law to get sex while for me such compulsory sex equals rape!



Thursday, January 17, 2013


Judie Foster! Hello there! You don't have "to come out". You've been out all the time according to Human Rights!


Article 2 of the Universal Human Rights Declaration

  • Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.


Klevius' explanation to those who can't read properly: In the non-islamic free world you can marry/cohabit or have friendship ties with anyone without having hetero-sex or sex at all! It's completely up to you as an individual.

Dear Jodie, for example, we don't expect hetero-couples "to come out" telling us they have never had sex, do we?!

Read more on What's sex segregation?

"The essence of her being ("the Woman") is sex, that she is a born prostitute, and that, on becoming older, she schemes to make young women follow the same path" (Otto Weininger some 100 years ago).


Klevius help for stupid readers: By "Woman" Weininger means the cultural construction, not the individual. Also remember that when Wittgenstein was criticized for having Weininger as one of his few idols he just pointed out that one could negate everything Weininger had written and still profit on him. And if you still feel confused please do ask for more help via comments.